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Abstract 
 
Some European countries have devolved health care services to subnational units. This is 
especially the case in unitary states that are organised as a national health service, where choice 
is not ‘built into’ the health care system. We argue that there are different models of devolving 
authority to subnational jurisdictions which have repercussions for regional health care 
inequalities and the amount of policy interdependence across regions. We examine broad trends 
in two institutional models of devolution:  a ‘federacy model’, where only a few territories obtain 
health care responsibilities (such as in the United Kingdom), and a ‘systems model’, where the 
whole health system is devolved to a full set of subnational units (such as in Spain). This paper 
briefly discusses the impact of these two models of devolution on the regional diversity of the 
health system. Our findings suggest that a ‘systems model’ of decentralisation, unlike a 
‘federacy model’, gives rise to significant policy interdependence. Another finding indicates 
that geographical dispersion of health care activity is larger in the ‘federacy model’. 
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Varieties of Health Care Devolution: 
 “Systems or Federacies”? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The devolution of public service responsibility in unitary states is a common 
phenomenon throughout European countries. This is especially the case in 
specific welfare services such as health. Some European nations have devolved 
health care services to subnational units (Costa-Font and Greer, 2013). This has 
been largely a response to various pressures including demands for the 
expansion of government responsiveness and accountability, efficiency and 
competition, and the enhancement of policy innovation and transfers.  
However, whether these outcomes efficiently take place depends on the 
specific model of health care devolution design. Indeed, the devolution of 
government responsibilities does not follow a standard trend. One can identify 
at least two devolution models: a ‘federacy model’ and a ‘system model’. 
1.1 Models of devolution  
A ‘federacy model’ of devolution is typically one based on the transfer of 
government responsibilities only to certain specific territories while the bulk of 
the country remains centrally managed. Typically, territories that qualify as 
‘federacies’ can be identified by some distinctive characteristics such as 
historical rights (e.g., Scotland in the UK), or an implicit demand by the 
citizenry. We do not purposefully focus on identifying distinctive features, but 
on examining the impact on two relevant policy outcomes, bearing in mind that 
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both countries considered could have adopted either model of devolution. 
However, for the sake of this study it is not essential what determined the setup 
of a federacy, but the impact and effect of adopting a federacy model rather 
than an alternative. 
The alternative model one can devise sits at the other end of the institutional 
spectrum and consists of a model where all territorial units are held responsible 
for a specific policy domain, e.g., health care policy. This is irrespective of the 
existence of a pre-existing demand for self-governance or historical rights.  We 
define such a model as a ‘system of regional governments’, or simply, a 
‘systems model’.  
In order to spell out the relevant institutional difference between the two 
models, we examine evidence from two countries where health care is tax-
funded, and funds are allocated to regions in a similar way (e.g., capitated block 
grants such as the Barnett formula in the UK or an equivalent transfer 
mechanism in Spain).  Similarly, in both the UK and Spain, government activity 
is limited by some framework legislation set out at the time of the transfer of 
government responsibilities. However, those devolution models are mutually 
exclusive (e.g., either all regions hold health care responsibilities, or a few do). 
Nonetheless, countries that have implemented one model of devolution could 
well have set up an alternative one (e.g., Spain could have devolved health 
responsibilities only to Catalonia and the Basque Country, and the UK could 
have allocated the same health care responsibilities devolved to Scotland to all 
English regions). However, whether one model or the other performs better is 
not trivial but this has not been examined previously in the literature. This 
paper will focus on providing a tentative answer to such a question by 
examining at one dimension the extent of divergence and regional inequality 
that both models of devolution produce. This is a relevant dimension in the 
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context of a unitary state where regional cohesion in the delivery of public 
services is argued to be important. 
1.2 Devolution and Regional Inequality, Spain and the UK 
Among the main reasons for advocating one model of governance over 
another, it is essential to consider the effect of regional inequality (Costa-Font 
and Turati, 2018). Regional ‘equality’ in health care provision is an important 
policy goal of unitary states. For instance, medical trade unions in the UK have, 
at times, called for the centralisation of the working conditions of professionals 
working for the NHS on the grounds of a possible fragmentation of the NHS, 
and the need to strengthen the stewardship of the ministry of health. However, 
the spread of devolution in Spain shows that devolution instead opens up a 
game of ‘follow-the-leader’ where regions implementing new reforms which 
give rise to policy innovation (e.g., the Basque Country, Navarra and Catalonia 
developed new dental care for children and coordination between health and 
social care), which have eventually spread to the entire country, hence reducing 
regional inequality (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006).  
It is a factual and empirical question whether keeping health services 
centralised does indeed manage to reduce the diversity of the health system. 
The is especially the case when health care activity and, more generally, the 
demand for public services is often beyond government control; such as the 
health care preferences of patients and doctors about what they value the most 
form health system benefits. These are at least partly driven by differences and 
needs (e.g., a higher concentration of elderly people might lead to a demand of 
rehabilitation, etc.).  
A ‘systems model’ such as the one we observe in Spain, can give rise to some 
significant policy interdependence where some regions adopt policies that 
have already been implemented in other regions and have shown evidence of 
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success. However, in the absence of such policy interdependence, one would 
expect to see diversity in the system. In contrast, the ‘federacies’ model is 
designed to develop ‘distinct’ health services and hence policy 
interdependence is not what it seeks to promote, and it rarely leads to policy 
transfer. However, given that some regions remain centrally run (e.g. the NHS 
in England), one would expect to find that uniform policies and regulation 
would limit diversity, even though that does not necessarily imply outcome 
uniformity. Whether the dynamics of interdependence are different across 
governance models, and more specifically, whether they impact outcome 
diversity differently is a question on which we can garner some evidence. 
Costa-Font and Turati (2018) show that in Italy and Spain, regional inequalities 
in both quality and output (measured by health care expenditure per capita) 
decline after devolution. However, so far comparative policy evidence has not 
featured countries that fit a ‘federacy model’.  
The UK stands out as a typical example of a ‘federacy model’ where English 
regions remain governed by Whitehall, but the three other countries of the UK 
– Wales, Scotland and N. Ireland –were governed from their territories after 
2001. In contrast, but at the same time, Spain transferred health care 
responsibilities to all the Spanish regions or Autonomous Communities (ACs). 
Originally, health care decentralisation was asymmetric, but after 2001 a more 
symmetrical system was achieved. Hence, Spain qualifies as a ‘systems model’. 
Note that a systems model can be asymmetric in its funding (e.g., Basque 
Country or Navarra in Spain), and a ‘federacy model’ can be symmetric in its 
funding (e.g., Barnett’s formula in the UK). The difference between the models 
lies in two different strategies of devolution, one based on dividing the entire 
territory into governance units (systems model) and the other, in keeping most 
of the country centralised and only devolving health care to some states within 
the UK (federacy model). 
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1.3 Paper aim 
This paper sets out to contribute to answering the question of ‘what impact 
does devolution (understood as the regional decentralisation of government 
activity) have on regional inequality in government activity, and to what extent 
does the model of devolution make a difference in this regard.’ Specifically, 
given that both Spain and the UK could have adopted either model, we 
examine whether there are significant differences regarding regional 
disparities. To do so, we draw on evidence from the UK and Spanish health 
care devolution. We distinguish the period before and after the onset of the 
financial crises to examine the potential effect of heterogeneity resulting from 
spending cuts across the territory. Given that Spain and the UK have a similar 
health care financing (tax) system, they are reasonably comparable. Adding 
more countries to the analysis would increase the variation on other features. 
Health funding in both the UK and Spain is comparable in that both are tax-
funded and have expended the same proportion of their GDP to health care 
(see Figure 1). Finally, both are unitary states subject to comparable contexts. 
Figure 1. 
Relative Expenditure (%GDP) 
 Source: OECD, 2012. 
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We put forward the claim that there are different models of devolving 
authority to subnational jurisdictions, and these are consequential. We examine 
the extent of the impact of the ‘devolution model’ on two health system 
outcomes, specifically regional disparities and the degree of policy 
interdependence. Our findings suggest a systems model of devolution is 
shown to increase policy interdependence and does not worsen regional 
inequality (unlike the federacy model). Indeed, evidence from the UK shows 
that even when emulation might take place, there is no cognition of the process 
for political reasons, and instead, diversity results from the setting of explicitly 
different, and often, non-comparable policy goals.  Regional inequalities exhibit 
a declining pattern in Spain and the trends are much weaker.  
We organise the rest of paper as follows. Section two sets out some theoretical 
background. Section three provides a literature review in the context of 
‘varieties of devolution’ and the relationship between devolution and regional 
inequality. Sections four and five will present this paper’s results and 
discussion. 
 
2. Background: the devolution puzzle 
The process of devolution and its impact upon regional inequality has gained 
credence within the literature. Some theory suggests that decentralisation may, 
in fact, increase regional disparities because as resources are passed to sub-
central governments or regions, it consequently weakens inter-regional 
distribution intended for regional convergence (Prud’homme, 1995). In 
contrast, some work argues that devolution helps to reduce regional inequality 
(Oates, 1972; 1993). However, this literature does not distinguish between 
different models of devolution and does not explicitly examine a homogenous 
sector of policy activity. Indeed, some public services are more likely to be 
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devolved to sub-central governments across countries than others. Health care 
is the most common public service responsibility that has been devolved 
among European Union member states, and hence it has been compared across 
countries.  The focus on one welfare service (health care) is essential as health 
care is comparable across the two countries under examination in both how it 
is funded and the principles in which it is grounded. However, in what follows 
we do not attempt to describe the institutional differences and historical 
legacies between Spain and the UK. Instead, we point out the observed 
regularities in policy outcomes after devolution bearing in mind that health 
care was centrally managed before devolution was implemented. We assume 
that both countries could have adopted either model of devolution described 
(e.g., Spain could have devolved health care only to Catalonia, Basque Country 
and Galicia, or the UK could have devolved health care to all English regions 
too). 
 While the devolution process in the UK was indeed accelerated under the 
‘New’ Labour government, a centre-left party, between1997-2010, the 
Conservative government of 2015 has also taken a ‘pro-devolution’ stance and 
it too has begun to speed up the process. 1  The second caveat concerns 
innovation in welfare systems. Experimentation can lead to enhancements in 
welfare at the regional levels and support of this, Costa-Font and Rico (2006a) 
found that, more prominently, innovation in one region can spread to others 
and thus create a ‘race to the top’ as opposed to the argument of a ‘race to the 
bottom’. Moreover, in a further study Costa-Font and Rico (2006b) argue that 
if successful policies are copied by neighbouring and other regions, i.e. via 
lesson drawings, regional inequality would decrease and not increase. They 
                                                 
 1 As can be seen in the example of the devolution of health care spending to Manchester. Moreover, 
in the Chancellor George Osbourne’s budget in July 2015, he also put forward the devolution of 
expenditure to Cornwall and set out on a so called ‘devolution revolution’.  
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conclude that devolution decreases regional disparities (see also McEwen, 
2005; Shaw et al. 2009).  
 The explanation of policy diffusion and divergence for the reduction in 
inequalities and the reasons behind different politico-economic systems have 
been put forward by various scholars. MacKinnon (2015) argues that 
devolution has had a significant impact upon public policy both in Wales and 
Scotland. Another long-term effect put forward in the literature refers to the 
political influence upon a reform which has produced divergence for example 
in Wales and Scotland, less market-orientated changes, with more social 
democratic approaches to policy (MacKinnon, 2015; Greer 2003; Birrell, 2010). 
Indeed, given that latter governance model (localism and public health in 
Wales vs professionalism and cooperation in Scotland) are chosen policy 
options, they were intended models of governance which could have been 
adopted by other countries in the UK.   
The models of governance within the UK are not absent of comparison, 
emulation or policy learning, although the strategy was instead not to 
acknowledge similar improvements in other countries and set diverging policy 
goals instead.  For example, there is little doubt that longer waiting times in 
Wales compared with England spurred the Welsh Assembly government to 
give waiting time reduction a higher priority.  Scotland similarly took waiting 
times more seriously when its government saw the performance in England.  
However, there was no explicit recognition of the process for obvious political 
reasons, and instead, they focused on diverging policy goals to avoid being 
compared.  
Undoubtedly, it is these political games per se that have a bearing upon policy 
and thus, make up the types of devolution seen in Spain and the UK. Therefore, 
within a federacy, the politics of difference is a central characteristic. 
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3. Models of Devolution: The UK and Spain 
Both the UK and Spain embarked on their process of devolution for similar 
reasons and can be defined as unitary states that share some aspects of federal 
states (‘quasi-federal states’). Both the UK and Spain differ significantly 
regarding the transfer of powers to their regional governments. Therefore, we 
can argue that both the UK and Spain exhibit different ‘varieties of devolution’ 
and that devolution is indeed highly variegated in these two examples (Peck 
and Theodore, 2007). Devolution in the UK is based upon the separation of 
political and fiscal powers between the devolved parliaments of Scotland, 
Wales and N. Ireland, and the UK parliament (Keating, 2002; Mackinnon, 2015). 
Therefore, some leeway is given to these devolved governments in the 
development of their particular policies. Nevertheless, the UK Parliament can 
still legislate under the law, in theory, and in practice, for Scotland, Wales and 
N. Ireland. 
In the UK, the three devolved administrations receive a block allocation from 
the UK Parliament in Westminster out of which they have to decide what 
proportion should be allocated to the NHS, social care, and education and so 
on.  This contrasts with the Spanish case where block grants are received from 
the Spanish government except for the Basque Country and Navarra which are 
fully fiscally accountable. However, it is important to point out that the Barnett 
formula that determines these block allocations in the UK predates political 
devolution.   
An essential difference between the UK and Spain lies in that the post-
devolution UK lacks any UK-wide, federal governance institutions.  However, 
this is not the case in Spain where the Ministry of Health does exist and exerts 
some critical coordination roles alongside the provision of information. The 
only exception where the UK and Spain are comparable is the fact that the 
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English Department of Health undertakes some UK-wide functions on behalf 
of the other three devolved administrations regarding international relations 
affecting the NHS.   
The Government of Wales Act 1998 was the impetus for devolution in Wales, 
creating the Welsh Assembly and devolving powers in areas such as health care 
provision. The Scotland Act 1998 in contrast, granted powers to the Scottish 
Parliament on a reserved basis while in Northern Ireland, the Good Friday 
Agreement 1998 paved the way for the devolution of powers under the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998. It is also important to note that the devolved 
parliaments have narrow revenue-raising powers (MacKinnon, 2015). 
Importantly, and similar to the Spanish case, the devolved assemblies and 
Scottish Parliament in the UK are elected on a wholly different basis from the 
Westminster Parliament. They use variant forms of proportional 
representation which may well affect the nature of the policies adopted in the 
devolved administrations.  Hence, the political majorities in the devolved 
assemblies do not necessarily reproduce the electoral results of nation-wide 
elections.  
In 2014, Wales received some limited tax-raising powers in the form of stamp 
duty and landfill tax. Absent from devolution is England, which has one 
government and legislature, namely the UK Government and UK parliament 
respectively, compared to two each for Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland. The 
UK, therefore, can be best described as a state categorised by the ‘federacy 
model’ (Rokan and Unwin, 1983; Rhodes, 1997; Keating, 1998; Cooke and 
Clifton, 2005).  
In contrast to the UK, Spain has a different devolutionary arrangement. 
Paradoxically, Spain began as a highly centralised, unitary state which has 
undertaken asymmetric devolution, passing power to the 17 ‘autonomous 
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communities’ (ACs), (Carbonell and Alcalde, 2008; Maiz et al. 2008). However, 
Spanish devolution has evolved a ‘systems model’, especially in the area of 
health care. Since 2002, all ACs have had the same responsibilities except for 
two; the Basque Country and Navarra, which collect their taxes and are thus, 
fiscally independent and politically accountable for running health care 
provision (Prieto and Lago-Penas, 2012).  
 The concept of ‘varieties of devolution’ is directly applicable to health care 
because unlike the UK where health care is devolved to Scotland, Wales and N. 
Ireland, although not yet to England and its regions (apart from Manchester as 
of 2015), Spanish heal thcare management is devolved to its 17 ACs.  
The size of the devolved administration is consistent with the federacy in the 
UK v system model of devolution in Spain. Although the total population of 
the UK is larger than that of Spain, the UK model has kept an English 
centralised NHS that provides care to 53 million individuals. In contrast, the 
population of the devolved administrations amount only to one-fifth of-of such 
figure (Scotland 5.2 million, 3 million and Northern Ireland 1.8 million). In 
contrast to Spain, where the 47 million inhabitants receive decentralised health 
care, and where regional population size ranges from 8 million in Andalucia, 
7.5 million in Catalonia to 0.3 million in La Rioja. 
Finally, it has been argued that four health care models characterise the UK. 
Wales adopted a system based on localism, a bottom-up approach to health 
care. In comparison, Scotland exhibits a model of medical professionalism, 
Northern Ireland a model of permissive managerialism; while the English 
model, unsurprisingly, is focused on a market and performance management 
approach (Greer, 2004). The notion of the ‘politics of difference’ is a central 
character in the type of devolution associated with the UK, and is directly 
reflected in the approach to health care. This approach can be attributed to the 
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permissive nature of the type of devolution, which facilitates policy divergence 
(Mackinnon, 2015; Greer, 2007, Jeffery, 2007). Spain, in contrast with its 
devolved health care systems and autonomous fiscal regions, is more akin to 
the ‘systems’ model of devolution. 
 
4. Regional Disparities  
To examine the effects of devolution on convergence, a simple and commonly 
accepted strategy is to identify a measure of health care output (unadjusted 
health expenditure per capita) and examine an inequality index. Consistently 
with previous studies, we employ the coefficient of variation as it is simple to 
interpret and it facilitates comparisons with some previous studies (Costa-Font, 
2010a, Costa-Font and Turati, 2018).  Figure 2, provides the evidence of the 
trends in unadjusted per capita health expenditure in Spain, England and the 
UK as a whole.   
We limit the analysis of 2000-2009 to avoid our analysis being affected by the 
economic downturn post 2009. Figure 2, suggests a reduction in the coefficient 
of variation of unadjusted public expenditure per capita over the period 2000-
2009, highlighting a downward trend regarding regional disparities. For 
example, decreasing from 0.006 to 0.004 in the same period. In contrast, there 
is more of a discrepancy when analysing the UK as a whole, which has seen a 
more turbulent movement in the level of regional disparities, which is 
significantly larger when we examine England than the UK as a whole.  As 
such, in the short term, it can be argued that in the cases of both Spain and the 
UK, both show a decrease in regional inequality which happens to be speeder 
in the Spanish ‘system model’. Similar results are found when Italy is included 
in the analysis as suggested by Costa-Font and Turati (2018).  The latter, results 
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are consistent with our argument as Italy qualifies as a system model along the 
lines of Spain. 
Figure 2.  Regional Inequalities on Unadjusted Health Care Output (expenditure per capita) 
 Source: MT Treasury and Spanish Ministry of Health, 20012. Note: Inequalities are measures as the coefficient of variation of the unadjusted per capita health care spending in each of the units examined. The coefficient of variation is defined as the ration between the standard deviation and the mean of the variable. 
 
5. Discussion 
In the previous section we have identified some evidence that suggests that 
both in Spain or the UK, devolution has not increased regional inequalities, and 
in Spain, we see a significant reduction of regional disparities consistently with 
other previous studies (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006 and Costa-Font and Turati, 
2018). In line with Pollock (1999) and Morgan (2002), we find that devolution 
has helped to address regional preferences in health care, as is evident from the 
decrease in inequality in Spain and the UK. Devolution has helped to overcome 
veto points in health care reform. For instance, in the case of the UK, 
decentralization has by allowing health care in Wales, Scotland and Northern 
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Ireland to be tailored to its preferences (e.g., elimination of prescription 
charges, free long-term care in Scotland). Hence, overcoming the potential veto 
in a centralised UK-wide health system. Similarly, in Spain it has allowed the 
Basque Country and Navarra to introduce free dental care for children under 
15, Catalonia to design a health technology agency and coordinate further 
health and social care and the Canaries to provide funding for a second medical 
opinion when needed. The difference between the UK and Spain is that many 
of the reform we identify in Spain have been transferred to other regional 
states, while there is more limited policy transfer within the countries of the 
UK.    
In addition, our evidence indicates a higher regional inequality in the UK and 
England, than in Spain, which can be explained by some factors including the 
historical distribution of teaching hospitals, different political legacies and 
dynamics. However, these have not been radically modified over the period 
observed, and hence they are unlikely to explain the patterns of regional health 
inequality. Instead, explanations for the reduction of regional health care 
inequality in Spain and a more moderate one in the UK lie within the politico-
economic makeup of each country, which is highly ‘variegated’ (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007). In essence, the political economy of the ‘federacy’ and 
‘federation’ models have had a positive impact on the relationship between 
regional inequality and devolution in the UK and Spain. For example, Spain is 
categorised by significant policy diffusion and innovation. In the Spanish ACs, 
particular policies have been ‘lesson drawn’ and implemented by other ACs. 
For example, there has been significant diffusion in health and ageing services, 
second opinions and dental care for children (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006). As 
such, the type of devolution in Spain has encouraged policy diffusion and 
innovation to take place and could hold explanations for the decrease in 
regional inequality.  
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A central characteristic to highlight are the political differences between the 
‘regions’ in the UK, which are important when analysing the relationship 
between devolution and regional inequality. As Andrews and Martin (2010, 
p.929) note ‘the creation of new devolved political institutions in 1999 placed 
the pursuit of distinctive policy agendas on a far firmer constitutional footing… 
unleashing much more forceful and explicit expressions of the ideological and 
cultural differences between different parts of Britain’. The pursuit of policy 
divergence, therefore, plays a key role in debates such as the relationship 
between regional inequality in health care provision and devolution. 
Interestingly, in their study on public service outcomes, Andrews and Martin 
(2010) find that differences in health care and education are attributable to some 
extent to policy divergence since devolution began. Regarding the performance 
of public services, including health, the differences in public service outcome 
widened following devolution. Nevertheless, regional inequality in health care 
provision in the UK as a whole has experienced a slow but downwards trend. 
Moreover, Bevan et al. (2014) finds ‘that the increasing divergence of policies 
since devolution has been associated with a matching divergence of 
performance’.  This would be consistent with limited pro-efficiency policy 
transfer.  The findings in the UK are directly related to the effects of a lack of 
devolution in England.  Indeed, a centre-region dynamic might come when 
each level has some stake in the health policy domain in the Spanish Case 
(Costa-Font and Rico, 2006 a).  
From our findings, one can argue that should health policy be devolved to 
England as a whole -and that level of government made distinct from the UK 
level, a centre region dynamic might emerge.  In other words, the UK has four 
'little worlds' of health care, which do not interact in ways that could deliver a 
'race to the top' as in Spain (Costa-Font, 2006b).  One needs to acknowledge 
some level of policy comparison over health policy does in the UK, for example 
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as between Wales and England does exist when it comes to the adoption of 
some policies like ambulance time target in England (Bevan, 2014). However, 
so far it has not produced significant policy changes in the policy priorities of 
each country.  
Finally, in comparing Spain and the UK, the model of devolution does indeed 
impact upon regional inequalities as a result of the politico-economic makeup 
of these models. Both models of devolution have helped to reduce regional 
disparities and therefore the myth surrounding standard arguments against 
devolution by increased inequality should be dispelled. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have broadly discussed whether different models of devolution enhance 
policy diversity. General trends indicate different patterns of inequality in 
health care expenditure per capita and policy interdependence Spain and the 
UK after devolution. In the Spanish NHS, we find considerable policy 
interdependence and stark decreasing regional disparities, while in the UK we 
see policy divergence and hardly any change in territorial inequality patterns. 
Hence, these results shed light on a central feature of the devolution debate, 
namely that reducing central government role in health care policymaking 
does not encompass the expansion of regional inequalities and can lead to 
spontaneous policy interdependence.  However, for obvious reasons the results 
do not establish a causal association. They are consistent with similar studies 
comparing devolution in Italy and Spain, which suggest that in both countries 
devolution did not increase regional inequalities (Costa-Font and Turati, 2017).  
In February 2015, the UK government devolved control of NHS spending to 
the Greater Manchester region. Budget responsibility will be devolved to a 
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partnership of councils and local NHS commissioning groups and providers. 
Our results would suggest that if devolution is extended to other English 
regions it has the potential to reduce regional inequality in health care. A policy 
that has hitherto not been adopted. Hence, there is a chance that existing 
regional diversity in the British NHS could be corrected by further devolution 
of health care responsibilities to regional authorities. 
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